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The Simple(r)  Algebra of Pension  Plans
Dimitri VittasI.  INTRODUCTION'
The success of the Chilean pension reform of the early 1980s
and the continuing  financial pressures  facing the social security
systems of many developing and some developed countries have
elicited considerable  interest in the mechanics  of pension
systems that are based on fully-funded individual capitalization
accounts.  Such systems are known as defined-contribution  systems
because they pay pensions that depend  on the contributions made
during a person's working life and the investment income
generated  by investing the accumulated  funds.
Fully-funded  defined-contribution systems are one of three
main forms of organizing the provision and financing of pensions.
Many countries,  both developed and developing  ones, especially  in
Latin America,  have social security systems that operate on a
pay-as-you-go  basis, i.e. pensions to retired people and their
dependents  are financed from the current contributions of active
workers  (in most cases, transfers from general tax revenue are
also used to cover any deficit).  Such systems are known as
unfunded defined-benefit schemes because they do not accumulate
any savings to fund future pensions and pension bsnefits are not
directly  linked to the contributions made on an individual basis.
Pay-as-you-go  systems face financial difficulties because of the
aging of the popilation of many countries and also because of
evasion, which not surprisingly is particularly pronounced  in
countries with high contribution rates.
The third main system of pension finance involves funded
defined-benefit  plans.  The social security systems of some
countries operate on a  (partially) funded basis, while company-
based pension schemes are also often based on funded defined-
benefit systems.
The various types of pension schemes have their distinct
operating  characteristics and raise different economic and
regulatory  issues 2. However, a common  feature of funded pension
plans, whether they are based on defined benefits or on defined
contributions,  is the accumulation of a capital fund over the
working  lives of members to provide a desired pension to its
beneficiaries  after retirement.
I  The  (r) in the title of this paper reflects the sad
fact that pension issues are highly  complex and almost nothing is
really  "simple" about them.
2  Vittas and Skully (1992) provide an overview of the
operating characteristics of different types of contractual
savings institutions and pension systems, while James  (1992)
reviews policy  issues in providing income security for old age.
1A basic question  facing policymakers in countries  that
contemplate the introduction of a pension system  based on fully-
funded individual  capitalization accounts concerns  the
contribution rate that would be required to cover an adequate but
affordable  level of pension.  Pension plan calculations  can be
complicated by a plethora of necessary actuarial  assumptions.
However, these actuarial  assumptions somehow obscure a
fundamentally simpler algebra that underlines the working of
pension plans.
The purpose  of this paper is to set out the relationship
between contribution  and pension rates under different
assumptions about  the length of working and retirement  life and
about real rates  of interest and rates of growth  of real wages 3.
In addition,  the paper uses this algebra to illustrate  some basic
policy  issues.
The paper  is divided into four sections.  Following this
introduction, Section II sets out the simpler algebra of defined
contribution plans.  Section III develops the a_gebra of defined
benefit plans.  Finally, Section IV discusses  a number of policy
issues, such as the required contribution rates for defined
contribution  schemes, the treatment of early leavers and high
fliers under defined benefit plans, the macrofinancial
implications of funded schemes, and the contrast between funded
and pay-as-you-go  systems in dealing with demographic  pressures,
Although  the paper mostly deals with a mechanical
application  of the algebra involved, and makes  no assumptions or
predictions  about behavioral changes or effects, a number of
interesting results are worth noting:
*  Unless  the real rate of interest exceeds  the growth
rate of real wages by a significant margin  of 2 to 3
percentage  points, payment of a reasonable  pension rate
requires  a high contribution rate and/or  a high active
worklife  ratio4.
*  It is more difficult for a high growth  economy to
provide  a high pension rate, though the absolute level
of the pension could be higher there than  in a low
growth  economy with a high pension rate.
*  When pensions are indexed to prices, the level of
interest and growth rates affects positively  the level
of the pension rate.  But when pensions  are indexed to
3  For other papers that examine the basic  algebra of
pension plans,  see Bonilla (1992)  and Schwarz  (1992).
4  I.e. the ratio of working life to retirement  life.
2wages, only the difference  between interest rates and
growth rates has an effect on pension rates.  Of
course, irn  all cases, the active worklife ratio he- a
positive effect on the pension rate.
*  The timing  of contributions, and therefore the pattern
of earnings over a person's lifetime career, has a
significant, though not major, effect on pension  rates.
*  Employar-based  final salary defined benefit plans
penalize early leavers  (unless their pension rights  are
fully transferable) and favor late high fliers  (who
would  in most corporations normally come from the ranks
of senior management).
*  Full funding with universal coverage and full lifetime
careers would lead to a massive accumulation of
capital, especially if the demographic structure
resembles a pillar rather than the more traditional
pyramid.
A  A massive accumulation of pension fund assets would
have far--reaching  implications for the productivity  of
capital and the functioning of financial systems.
- Full funding may not provide a solution to the
financial pressures caused by demographic changes.  An
increase  in  the  retirement  age  may  be  required  under
both  funded  and  unfunded  pension  systems  in  order  to
cope  effectively  with  population aging.  This will
result  in  a  higher  active  worklife  ratio  and  a  lower
dependency ratio.
*  In view of the considerable uncertainties involved, a
mixed system combining a redistributive first pillar
and a fully funded defined contribution second pillar
would represent a more prudent, and perhaps also more
equitable, approach in reforming pension systems.
*  Although most of the analysis is based on constant
contribution and pension rates, both rates could in
practice be variable.  In fact, allowing workers to set
both their own contribution and pension rates, within  a
specified range, might be preferable and more
consistent with greater reliance on personal choice.
3II.  TWE ALGEBRA  OF DEFINED CONTRIBUTION  PLANS
2.1  The simplest  case
The simplest  possible case is one where both the real rate
of interest and the growth rate of real wages 5 are equal to zero.
Pensions are assumed to be indexed to either prices or wages and
thus inflation has no impact on the calculations  involved
(alternatively,  inflation may be assumed to be zero) 6.
The L.bjective  of the pension plan is to accumulate capital
over the working  life of workers which will be used to make
pension payments  over their retirement.
(1)  k * W * n  p * W *  m
where
k  is the contribution rate
W  is the gross real wage
p  is the gross pension  (or replacement)  rate, i.e
the ratio of the pension to the gross real wage
n  is the length of the working life and
E  is the length of life in retirement.
Solving equation  (1)  for the gross pension rate yields
(2)  p  =  k*  n
m
The gross pension rate is greater, the greater the
contribution  rate and the greater the ratio  of working life over
retirement  life.  If the working life is 40 years and the
retirement  life is 20 years, and if the desired gross pension  (or
replacement)  rate is 50%, the required contribution rate would be
25% of the gross wage 7 .
5  It is the growth rate of the real wage of the
individual worker  that needs to be taken into account.  This
would reflect both the growth of average real wages and the
progression  of the individual worker  in terms of seniority.
However, to simplify matters the examples are based on average
representative  workers whose wages increase by the average growth
rate of real wages.
6  This paper assumes throughout that pensions are indexed
either to prices  or to wages.  For a discussion  of the effect of
inflation when pensions are not indexed, see Schwarz  (1992).
7  It is interesting to note that in this case the capital
fund accumulated  at the time of retirement after 4C years of
contributions  would correspond to 10 times the annual gross wage.
4Note,  however,  that  "Sp"  is the  ratio  of the  pension  to the
gross wage before  deducting contributions.  If "b" is the net
pension rate, i.e. the ratio of the pension to the net wage
received after deducting  contributions, then
(3)  b  = 
1-k
Thus, with a 25% contribution rate, a 50% gross pension rate
would correspond to a 66% net pension rate.  To achieve a 100l
net pension rate, a contribution rate of 33% would  be required.
The gross pension rate would then amount to 66%.
The following  additional simple results can be obtained:
if k=10%,  n=40 and m=20, then p=20% and b=22%
if k=10%,  n=45 and m=15, then p=30% and b--33%
if k=10%,  n-30 and m=10, then p=30% and b=33%
if k=20%, n=40 and m=20, then p=40% and b=50%
if k=20%, n=45 and m=15, then p=60% and b=75%.
It can be seen that in the case where the real rate of
interest  and  the  growth  rate  of  real  wages  are  both  equal  to
zero,  a  high  contribution  rate  would  be  required  in  order  to
receive a "decent" pension,  i.e. a pension that corresponds  to a
relatively high net replacement ratio.  As discussed  below, a
high  contribution  rate  would  be  required  for  a  decent  pension  in
all  cases,  except  where  the  real  rate  of  interest  is  much  greater
than the growth  rate  of  the  real  wage,  or  the  active  worklife
ratio is very high.
2.2  The case where  the real rate of interest is positive
The algebra becomes somewhat more complex if we allow for a
positive real race of interest but continue to assume  zero growth
in real wages.  If rontributions are paid at the end of each
year, the first year's  contributions will accumulate  interest for
(n-1) years, those of the second year for (n-2) years,  and so
on.  At the time of retirement, the accumulated value of the fund
will be equal to the value of pension payments, which  will be
given by a series  of discounted payments, with the last one
discounted for "Im"  years.  The ubjective function of the pension
plan will then look as follows:
(4)  k  *  W  *  S  =  p  *  W *  A
where
S  is the accumulated value of a stream  of payments
for n years invested at a real interest rate of r
per cent and
5A  is the discounted value of a stream of payments
for a  years at a real rate of interest of r  per
cent.
(5)  S  =  (l+r)  (-) +  (1+r)(>  +  . . . +  (l+r)  + 1
and
(6)  A  =J1_  +  1  +  ...  +  I
(l+r)  (l+r) 2 (l+r) m
Equation  (2) will then become
(7)  p  =  k*  S
A
Note  that  the  values  of  "8"  and  "A"  wili  be  equal  to  "Ia"  and
"Im" respectively  if  the  rate  of  interest  is  zero.  At a positiva
rate  of  interest, "8'"  is greater than "n", while "A" is smaller
than  "Im".  Thus,  for  a  given  contribution  rate,  a  higher  pension
rate is obtained.
With a real rate of interest of 3%, "'n"  equal to 40 and "nm"
equal to 20, "S" amounts to 75.40 and "A" to 14.88.  A 10%
contribution  rate would then fund a gross pension rate of 51% and
a net pension rate of 56%.
However,  if retirement is delayed by 5 years, the working
life would  increase to 45 years and, assuming no change  in life
expectancy,  the retirement life will decline to 15 years, giving
an active worklife ratio of 3.  Under these conditions and
continuing to assume a 3% real rate of return, "8" will amount to
92.72 and "A" to 11.94.  The gross pension rate from a 10%
contribution rate would then equal 78%, corresponding to a net
pension rate of 87%.
2.3  The case where the real interest rate and the growth rate of
real wages are positive and equal, and pensions are indexed
to price inflation
When we allow for a positive rate of growth of the real wage
as well as a positive real rate of interest, the formula for the
accumulation of the capital fund is more complicated.  If the
plan aims to provide a pension that is a fraction of the final
salary, the objective function of the pension plan has to take
6account  of  both  the  growth  in  wages  and  the  level  of  the  final
wage:
(8)  k  * W  * F  - p  *  W * (1+g)*°  *  A
where
F  is  a  stream  of  payments  that  grow  by  "g" per  cent
and  earn  interest  at  "r"  per  cent.  i.e.
(9)  F  =  (l+r)(-')  + (1A+g)  (+r)02  +
+  (1+g) 2(1+r) (6 + . . . +
+  (1+g)  (-(1+r) +  (2+g)(> 1
With g=r,
(10)  F  n * (1+g)
and equation  (8) becomes
(11)  k * W  * n *  (1+g)("'  p * W  * (l+g)(>')  * A
and
(12)  p  k*  n
A
With g=r>o%,  a given contribution rate produces  a pension
rate that is higher than when g=r=O%, but lower than when r>O%
and g=-0.  Thus, with a contribution rate of 10%, "u" equal to 40
and "nm"  equal to 20, the gross pension rate when  r=g=3% will be
27% and the net pension rate 30%.  With "n" equal to 45 and "Im"
equal to 15, the gross pension rate will be 38% and the net
pension rate 42%.
2.4  The case where "g" and "r" are positive but not equal and
pensions are indexed to prices
If "g" and "r" are positive but not equal,  the value of the
fund at retirement  is given by the sum of the geometric  series of
equation  (9).
s  If pension plans aim to provide a pension  related to
average actualized  lifetime earnings, the right-hand  side of
equation  (8) must be multiplied by the ratio of average wages to
the final wage.
7(13)  r  (1= r)a  -.  tl*
(r  -g)
Equation  (11) then becomes
(14)  k *  W  * F  p * W * G * A
where G =  (l+g)  * 1)  and
(15)  p  =k  *
G *A
For a given contribution rate, the pension rate d&pends on
the  relative  values  oZ  "g" and "r"  as well as the values of l'r"
and  "ma". The  greater  the  growth  rate  of  real  wages,  the  higher
the  real  rate  of  irterest  that  is  requires  to  achieve  a  desired
pension rate as a percentage of the final wage.  However:  a
higher "g" also implies a higher final wage so that a lower
pension rate may in fact correspond tz  a  higiher  pension  in
absolute ternms.
Tables la and lb (and Figures la and lb) show the
relationship between Lhe gross pension rate and the real interest
rate for different growth rates of real wages, when pensions are
indexed to prices.  It can be seen from Table la that with k=10%,
n=40 and m=20, when ge2% and r=3% the gross pension rate amounts
to 33%, but when g=3% and r=2% the gross pension rate falls to
20%.  A 3 percentage points difference between the real rate of
intsrest and the growth rate of real wages is required for a
pension rate in excess of 50%.
Table lb provides the same information for "In"  equal to 45
and  'm"  equal to 15. It can be seen that when g=2% and r=3% the
gross pension rate is 47%, while when g=3% and r=2% it is 29%.
These pension rates are higher than those shown in Table  la.
They reflect the lonqer working and shorter retirement  lives and
the effects of compounding.  A 2 percentage points difference
between "r" and 'g" is adequate  to produce  gross  pension  rates  in
excess of 50%.  When r=5% and g=3%, the pension rate amounts to
68%.
When pensions are indexed to prices, the levels of interest
rates and wage growth rates also affect the level of pension
rates.  Thus, as shown in Table la, when r=g=1% the pension rate
amounts to 22%, but rises to 27% with r-z=3%.  The corresponding
pension rates in Table lb are 33% and 38%.
In considering the entries of Tables la and lb (as well as
those of following tables) it should be noted that only those
combinations that result in reasonable pension rates of between
50% and 70% would be compatible with the "ssumed :ontribution
8Table la
Targeted  Pension Rate with Pensions  Indexed to  Prices
k=10%, n=40, m=20
Growth Rate of  Real Wages
0%  1%  2%  3%  4%  b%
Real Interest Rate
0%  20.0  16.6  14.0  11.9  10.3  9.0
1%  27.1  22.2  18.4  l5.5  13.3  11.5
2t  36.9  29.8  24.5  20.4  1.7.2  14.7
3%  50.7  40.4  32.7  26.9  22.4  18.9
4%  69.9  55.1  44.1  35.8  29.4  24.6
5%  96.9  75.5  59.7  47.9  38.9  32.1
10%  519.9  387.5  292.0  222.5  171.6  133.9
Table lb
Targeted Pension Rate with Pensions Indexed to Prices
ks=l0%,  n=45, m=15
Growth Rata of Real Wages
0%  1%  2%  3%  4%  5%
Real Interest Rate
0%  30.0  24.3  20.0  16.8  14.4  12.4
1%  40.7  32.5  26.4  21.8  18.3  15.6
2*  56.0  43.9  35.0  28.5  23.6  .19.9
3%  77.7  59.9  47.1  37.7  30.7  25.5
4%  108.9  82.8  64.0  50.5  40.5  33.0
5%  153.9  115.4  88.0  68.3  53.9  43.4
10%  945.2  672.5  484.4  353.5  261.6  196.4
9Figure la
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10rate and working and retirement  lives.  For instance  in Table la,
only  the combinat,  ns r=3% & g=%0,  r=4% A g=1%,  ri5% G g=2%, and
r=S%  g=3%,  woulU produce  reasonable  pension  rates.  Entries to
the top right of these  combinations  would imply  a higher required
contribution  rate or worklife  ratio for the achievement  of
reasonable  pension  targets,  while entries  to the bottom  left
would imply  a lower  required  contribution  rate or worklife ratio.
Moreover, some  combinations,  such  as those involving  a 10% real
rate of interest  over  a 60 year period,  would be unlikely  to
occur.
2.5  The case of indexing  pensions  to wages  with g=nr
Indexing  pensions  to prices  maintains  their  real value.
However, if one is concerned  to maintain  the value of pensions
relative  to wages  and thus  ensure  that  pensioners  benefit from
continuing  growth,  pensions  must be indexed  to wages.  Of course,
if real wages fall,  due to macroeconomic  crisis,  then real
pensions  would also decline.  Indexing  pensions  to wages is
generally  more expensive  and requires  higher  contributions  rates,
if real wage growth  is positive.
When pensions  are indexed  to wages,  the value  of pension
payments at the time of retirement  is given  by
(16)  D  =  (lea)  +  ( 1l+a) 2 +  ...  +  (1+cf)  (-1)  +  (l+a)
(l+r)  (l+r) 2 (l+r)(nl)  (1+r) m
If g=r, then equation (16)  simplifies  to
(17)  D  =  m
and equation (11)  becomes
(18)  k *  W * n  *G  =  p * W * G *  m
and
(19)  p  =  k*  n
m
This is identical  to equation (2)  and provides  a simple
approximation  to the required  contribution  rate  whsn the real
rate of interest  and the growth  rate  of real wages  are assumed to
be equal.  Since  in real life,  "g" and "r" are determined
endogenously  and cannot  deviate  much from  each other  for long
periods  of  time,  equation  (19)  (though  very  simple)  offers  a  good
approximation  of the required  contribution  rate for a targeted
pension rate that effectively  depends  on the active  worklife
ratio.
112.6  The case  of indexing pensions to wages with unequal  "g"  and
If  "g" and  "r"  are  not  equal,  then  the  value  of  wage-indexed
pensions at the time of retirement is given by the  sum  of  the
geometric series of equation (16).  This is equal to
(20)  D  =  t (l+q)  - 1  *  +a)
(l+r)  ]  g-r
In this case, equation (14) becomes
(21)  k  *  W  *  F  =  p  *  W  *  G  *  D
and equation  (15)
(22)  p  =  k*  F
G  *  D
Tables  2a and 2b (and Figures 2a and 2b) show the
relationship  between the gross pension rate and the real interest
rate for different growth rates of real wages,  when pensions are
indexed to wages.  In general, wage indexation of pensions, when
real wages  are rising, requires either a higher rate of return or
a higher rate of contribution to achieve a given pension rate.
If g<r,  "D"  is  smaller  than  "Im" but greater than "A", so
that,  for  a  given  contribution  rate and when the growth rate of
the real wage is assumed to be positive, wage  indexation of
pensions causes a reduction in pension rates.  Table 2a shows
that with k=10%, n=40, m=20, g=2% and r=3%, the gross pension
rate will be 27%.  This is lower than the pension rate of 33%
achieved when pensions are indexed to prices.
If g>r, then "D" is greater than "Im".  A very high
contribution rate would be required to.  achieve a decent pension
rate.  Thus, with g=3% and r=2% the pension rate amounts to only
15%.  A contribution rate of 30% w^-)uld  be needed  to achieve a
gross pension rate of 45% that would then correspond  to a net
pension rate of 64%.
Table 2b shows the same relationships with k=10%, n=45 and
m=15.  The longer working and shorter retirement  lives result in
higher pension rates as in the case of Table  lb.
When pensions are indexed to wages, the pension rate is
determined by the difference between the real rate of interest
and the growth rate of real wages.  The levels of these two
variables  have little impact.  Of course, the cuntribution rate
and the length of the working and retirement  lives continue as
12basic  determinants  of pension  rates.  Thus,  with k=10%, nx40 and
m=20,  a difference  of 2% between  "r" and  "g"  produces  a  pension
rate  of  36-37%,  while  with  k-10%,  n=45 and m=15, the pension rate
is  55-56%.
13Table  2a
Targeted  Pension  Rate  with  Pensions  Indexed  to Wages
k=10%,  n=40,  m=20
Growth  Rate  of Real  Wages
0%  1%  2%  3%  4%  5%
Real  Interest  Rate
0%  20.0  14.9  11.3  8.6  6.7  5.2
1%  27.1  20.0  15.0  11.3  8.7  6.7
2%  36.9  27.0  20.0  15.0  11.4  8.7
3%  50.7  36.7  26.9  20.0  15.0  11.4
4%  69.9  50.2  36.5  26.9  20.0  15.1
5%  96.9  69.0  49.7  36.3  26.8  20.0
10%  519.9  359.1  250.3  176.0  125.0  89.6
Table  2b
Targeted  Pension  Rate  with  Pensions  Indexed  to Wages
k=10%,  n=45,  m=15
Growth  Rate  of Real  Wages
0%  1%  2%  3%  4%  5%
Real  Interest  Rate
0%  30.0  22.4  17.1  13.2  10.4  8.2
1%  40.7  30.0  22.5  17.1  13.3  10.4
2%  56.0  40.6  30.0  22.6  17.2  13.4
3%  77.7  55.6  40.5  30.0  22.6  17.3
4%  108.9  76.9  55.3  40.4  30.0  22.7
5%  153.9  107.4  76.2  54.9  40.3  30.0
10%  945.2  631.3  426.4  291.5  201.8  141.6
14Figure 2a
Targeted Pension Rate with Pensions Indexed to Wages
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Real Interest  Rat. (%)III. THE  ALGEBRA OF DEFINED BENEFIT PLANS
This paper has so far dealt with plans based on constant
contribution rates.  These are mainly defined contribution  plans,
especially when they are established by the authorities  and are
mandatory  on all employees.  In such cases, a common contribution
rate normally applies to all employees irrespective of their age
and years of service, although the contribution rate may be
adjusted from time to time.
However, there is no reason why defined contribution  plans
should not operate with variable rates or with rates that vary
for different groups of employees 9. For instance, in the Chilean
pension scheme, the compulsory contribution rate is 10%, but
affiliates can make additional voluntary contributions  up to 20%
of earnings  (Vittz,s  and Iglesias 1992).  In Singapore,  the
standard contribution rate is a very high 40% of wages,  but
special lower rates apply for older workers.
Variable  contribution rates are more extensively  used for
defined benefit plans, where the pension rate depends on the
years of service of members.  Although sponsoring  firms make
annual contributions on the basis of projections about the group
structure of covered members in terms of age, salary  level and
length of service and in the light of actual and anticipated
investment returns  (Bodie 1990), in principle the collective
contributions are based on contributions that can be calculated
separately  for each employee.
The algebra of pension plans with variable contribution
rates is more complex than that for constant contribution  rates.
This is because a whole series of contribution rates  need to be
determined rather than the single rate used in plans with
constant contribution rates.
3.1  The case where r=g=O
As already noted, if g=r=O, the objective function of the
pension plan is given by
9  In systems with individual capitalization accounts,
workers may be given the right to vary their annual contribution
rates within an approved range, depending on whether their
accumulated balances are adequate for meeting a targeted pension
rate.  It should also be noted that targeted pension rates need
not be constant throughout a person's retirement.  If consumption
needs decline with age, a phased reduction in pension rates could
be built into the plans.  Such an approach may be preferable to
offering unindexed pensions, the real value of which would
decline in an unpredictable way.
16(23)  k  * W * n  =  p  * W  * m
In a defined benefit plan, the pension rate is equal to
(24)  p  =  n * q
where "q" is the rate of accrual of pension benefit as a per cent
of salary per year of service.  The contribution rate is then
constant and given by
(25)  k  =  q  * m
With  q=1%, n=40 and m=20, a contribution rate of 20% would
be needed to pay a pension rate of 40%.  A qg2% would require a
contribution  rate of 40% and would pay a pension rate of 80%.
3.2  The case where "r" is  positive but "g" is zero
If g=O but "r" is positive, and pensions are indexed to
prices, the contribution rate will vary from year to year, since
contributions  will be accumulating interest until the time of
retirement.  The contribution rate for the first year will be
(26)  k,  c  * A
(l+r)  (a-l)
where,  as above, "A" is the value at the time of r-tirement of a
stream  of  payments  for  "Im" years  at  a  real  rate  of  interest  of
"r"  per  cent.
The  contribution rate for the second year will be given by
(27)  k2 =  * A
(l+r)  (a-D
and  so  on  until  the  last  contribution  rate  will  be  given  by
(28)  kI  =  q*  A
In  general,
(29)  K  =A
(l+r)  (n-1)
If r=3%, q=1%, n=40 and m=20, then k,=4.70%  and  k,=14.88%.
If r=5%, then kl=1.86% and k=12.46%.  (Figure 3a shows the path
of annual  contribution rates.)
173.3  The  case  where  both  "r" and  "g" are  positive
If  both  "r'" and  "g"  are  positive,  the  calculation  of  annual
contribution  rates  becomes more complex and depends on whether
accumulated or projected benefits are taken into account.
Accumulated benefits  cover benefits already earned with regard to
past service, while  projected benefits also include benefits to
be earned with regard  to future service.
In the economic  literature on pension funds there  is
considerable debate  about the usefulness of actuarial  assumptions
for ascertaining the future liabilities of pension funds and
about the extent  of underfunding or overfunding of such
liabilities  (Bodie and Shoven, 1983).  In practice,  however,
actuarial assumptions  are required for both methods.  Estimating
accumulated benefits  requires assumptions about the planned
retirement age and the expected retirement  life of beneficiaries,
the growth  (i.e. price or wage indexation) of pensions,  and the
discount rate.  For projected benefits, further assumptions  about
future wage growth  are also required.
On the basis of projected benefits, the series  of
contribution rates with pensions indexed to prices will be
(30)  k, 1 =  (1+a)  ()  *  q  * A
(l+r)  (-)
(31)  k2 =  (1+q)  (  * q  * A
(34+r)  (a2)
and
(32)  k  =  q  * A
In general,
(33)  K  =  (l+g)(*  q *  A
(l+r)  (
However, if g=r, then the contribution rates are constant
and equal to
(34)  k  =  q  * A
With g=r=3%  and q=1%, n=40 and m=20, the contribution  rate
is equal to 14.88%.  With g=r=5%, it is 12.46%.  With g=5% and
r=3%, contribution rates start with a high k 1 of 31.55% and
decline to a k  of 14.88%.  In contrast, with r=5% and g=3%, k,  is
a low 5.88% rising gradually to a k,  of 12.46%.  (Figure 3b shows
the path of annual contribution rates for four different
combinations of interest and wage growth rates.)
18If reserves  are set aside  for  accumulated  benefits  only,  the
fund  will need to cover  the value  of the accrued  benefit  at the
time of retiremert,  without  any allowance  for projected  benefits
to be accrued.  This is given by the product of the accrual
factor  and the value of annuity  at the time of retirement.
Allowing  for the fact that reserves  will be invested  for (n-1)
years,  the first  year's  contribution  rate  will be equal  to
(35)  k  -c  a(+)A
(l+r)<s
For the second  year  of service,  the contribution  rate will
be expressed  as a fraction  of the new  wage W*(I+g).  After two
years of service,  the value  of the accrued  benefit will be equal
to twice the accrual  factor  times  the value of the annuity  at the
time of retirement  times  the wage  growth  factor.  Accumulated
reserves  will be invested  for (n-2)  years.  However,  the first
year's  reserves  will have accumulated  interest  for one year so
that the second's  year contribution  will be given by
(36)  k 2 =  T2
(1+g)
where
(37)  T2 =  2q  *  A *  (1+gl  - a  *  A
?  1+r)  (2  (l+r)  (".
After three  years  of service,  the;contribution  rate  will be
equal  to




(39)  T3 =  3a  *  A  *  (1+q) 2 2  2  *  A  *  (1+a)
(l+r)  l  3)(
and  after  "'n"  years of service
(40)  k  =  T
(1+g)
where
(41)  T.  n *  q *  A *  (l+g)* 1) - (n-l) *  q *  A *  (l+g)  2
In general,
19(42)  K  =  a  *  A  *  ri  - (i-2A/(l+a)l
( 1r)(*
With  g=3%  and  r=S%,  k, =  1.86%  and  k,  =  26.62%,  but  with
g=5%  and  r=3%,  k2 =  4.70%  and kx =  42.51%.  (Figure  3c shows  tha
path  of  annual  contribution  rates  for  the  same  four  combinations
of  interest  and  wage  growth  rates  as in Figure  3b.)
Using  projected  benefits  for i-termining  annual  contribution
rates  smooths  out  the  impact  of future  wage  growth,  but  may
req.ire  very  large  initial  contribution  rates  if wage  growth
exceeds  the  rate  of  interest.  On the  other  hand,  using
accumulated  benefits  as the  basis  for  determining  annual
contribution  rates  may  involve  large  changes  in contribution
rates  from  one  year  to the  next  as a result  of wage  growth  and
longer  service.  Contribution  rates  may  need  to  increase  steeply
l1.t.e  in the  working  life  of workers.
If pensions  are  indexed  to wages,  "A"  must  be replaced  with
"D'"  in equations  (26) through  (42).  Since  with  a positive  "g",
"D"  is  greater  than  "A",  wage  indexation  of pensions  will  require
higher  annual  contribution  rates  under  either  method.
20Figure 3a
Required  Contribution  Rate with Pensions Indexed to Prices
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21IV.  POLICY  ISSUES
The algebra developed in this paper is mechanical  in nature
and does not purport to shed any light on the effects of changes
in behavior  arising from the creation of funded and unfunded
pension schemes.  Nevertheless, it can be used to highlight a
number of important policy issues, such as the required
contribution  rates for defined contribution schemes, the
treatment of early leavers and high fliers under defined benefit
plans, the macrofinancial  implications of funded schemes, and the
contrast between funded and pay-as-you-go systems in dealing with
demographic  pressures.
4.1  Required  contribution rates
It is clear from Section II that a high targeted pension
rate requires  a high contribution rate unless the real rate of
interest is substantially higher than the rate of growth of real
wages.
Mandatory  retirement savings schemes, which  include both
national provident  funds and government mandated  but privately
run systems, such as the Chilean AFP system, impose contribution
rates that vary over a wide range.  In Singapore, the
contribution rate has been in excess of 35% for most of the
period since 1968.  The long-term target of the Singaporean
authorities  is for a 40% contribution rate, divided equally
between employers and employees.  This nominal rate corresponds
to an effective  contribution rate of 33% (i.e total contributions
of 40 out of a total payroll cost'  of 120).  In Malaysia, Nepal
and Sri Lanka the combined nominal contribution rate amounts to
20% (raised to 22% in Malaysia in 1992), while in a number of
African countries it is only 10%.
In Singapore, real wages have grown by more than 4% over the
past three decades or so, while the real return credited on CPF
balances has on average been around 2% (Vittas 1993).  Thus, on
the basis  of Tables la and lb, Singaporean workers on average
wages would  save enough over their working lives to buy an
annuity that could pay a pension rate ranging between 46% (if
they worked  for 40 years and lived in retirement  for another 20)
and 62%  (if they worked for 45 years and lived in retirement for
another 15).  If the pension is related to the net wage, then the
net replacement  rate would be 58% and 78% respectively.  One
could argue th_refore that the high contribution rate in
Singapore  is justified by the high growth rate of real wages.
However, the real rate of return has been low, while the right
given to CPF members to withdraw their funds for investments in
housing, approved securities, and other purposes  (e.g education)
suggests that the CPF is not used to meet solely pension
22objectives.  The balances left on the individual  accounts on
retirement would  effectively attain an even lower pension rate 10.
The Chilean AFP pension system imposes a 10% compulsory
contribution rate, which is entirely paid by employees.  To
attain a pension rate of 705 of final wages, which  is apparently
an objective of the scheme, would require a high real rate of
return, a low growth  rate of real wages or a high active worklife
ratio.  Table  la shows that, with n=40 and m=20, a real rate of
interest of  5% would  attain a pension rate of 60% if g=2% and 48%
if gw3%.  Table lb shows that, with n=45 and m=15, the pension
rates would rise to 88% and 68%, respectively.
Proponents  of the Chilean scheme also argue that the
targeted pension rates would be achieved with  lower real rates of
return if account is taken of the fact that workers experience a
higher rate of wage growth early in their ccreer with a
substantial deceleration  as they grow older.  This is because
workers will accumulate  a ptoportionally larger balance early on
that will be available  for interest compounding  over a longer
period.  Assuming that wages increase by 3.06% a year over the
first 20 years of a person's career and then by 1% over the next
20 years,  so that at the end of 40 years the final wage will be
the same as with  a constant 2% growth rate, a 10% contribution
rate will achieve a 63% pension rate if the real rate of interest
is 5% throughout.  This compares -ith 59% under a constant 2%
real growth rate.  The pension ra e will be even higher if one
assumes a steeper rise early on in a worker's  career with a more
dramatic deceleration  later.  If g,  is 4% and g 2 is 0.15%  (so that
overall growth is still 2%), the pension rate will  increase to
69%.  Thus,  it is the relationship of the rate of interest and
the wage growth rate over time that is important" 1. The effect
of  uneven or nonlinear  earnings profiles is significant, though
not as profound  as is sometimes argued.
10  For most of its existence, the CPF has allowed
withdrawals  of accumulated  balances in one lump suim  at age 55.
In recent years, however, a minimum balance under the so-called
Minimum Sum Scheme must be kept on the account to buy a pension
annuity starting at age 60.  The minimum amount is fixed in
absolute terms,  is indexed to inflation, and appears to be
adequate to buy a pension of around 25% of average wages.
11  The objective  function of the pension plan is
k * F,  * (l+r)  ('")  + k * F 2 * (1+gl)('.I)  =  p *  (1+g,)(v-l)  *  (l+g 2 )  (v) *  A
where  F 1 and F 2 are the sinking funds accumulated  in the first and
second periods and "v" is the length of the first period.
234.2  The treatment  of early leavers and high fliers
Defined benefit plans have a significant advantage  over
defined contribution plans in that they protect workers  from
investment risk and, if benefits are indexed, from inflation
risk.  However, realization of these advantages depends on
continuing employment with the same employer and on the solvency
and integrity of plan sponsors.
Defined benefit final salary plans suffer from two important
disadvantages.  These are the unequal treatment of early leavers
and long stayers, on the one hand, and high fliers and slow
plodders, on the other.
The problem of early leavers is more pronounced  when leaving
employees are denied  any vested rights, or if they have vested
rights but they are not allowed to transfer them to their new
employer.  If the annual accrual factor is 1.5% and average wage
growth is 2%, employees who change jobs in midcareer  would be
entitled to two pensions on retirement, one from their first
employer based on 30% of their salary at the time of leaving and
one from the second  employer based on 30% of their salary on
retirement.  With  a 2% growth rate, a starting salary of $10,000
would amount after 20 years to $14,600, while after another 20
years it would be equal to $21,600.  Workers who change jobs in
midcareer would receive a pension equal to 50% of their final
salary.  In contrast,  long stayers with a similar salary profile
would get 60% of their final salary.  The losses suffered by
early leavers would be even greater if pension rights are not
protected from inflation.  With a 5% inflation, the effective
pension rate for early leavers would fall to 38%.
The problem caused by high fliers can be seen by considering
equation  (40) which gives the required contribution rate in the
last year of service.  With g=3% and r=5%, the required
contribution for the last year would be 27%.  However,  if high
fliers are assumed to get a 10% increase in salary in their last
active year against a 3% average up to that time, equation  (40)
shows that their contribution rate should rise in the last year
to 57%.  A 30% salary rise in the last year would  require a 125%
contribution rate for that year.
In a defined contribution system, such additional
contributions would have to be made explicitly and would be more
transparent.  But in defined benefit schemes, the effects of
salary rises and promotion near the end of a person's  career are
obscured by the average contribution rates made on behalf of all
employees.  The unequal treatment between high fliers and slow
plodders  (or the average worker) is even greater when, as is
usually the case, most workers experience a significant  decline
in the growth rate of their earnings late in their careers.  It
24is argiued  by some that the popularity of defined benefit company
pension schemes is due to a significant extent to the favorable
treatment of senior managers who get big promotions  and large
salary rises  late in their careers.
A solution to the unequal treatment of early leavers and
high fliers would involve regulations that mandate  minimum
vesting periods,  full portability of vested rights, and use of
average actualized  lifetime earnings as the basis for determining
pensions.
4.3  Macroeconomic  and financial implications of funded schemes
Funded  schemes  accumulate  long-term  savings  that  are
available  for investment in long-term instruments,  such as
government  bonds, mortgage bonds and corporate securities as well
as real assets.  A question of major macroeconomic  and financial
significance  regards the pace and especially the limit of such
accumulation  in relation to a country's GNP.
To calculate  the total size of accumulated  funds, it is
necessary to make assumptions about the income and age
distribution of active and passive workers as well as about the
coverage of the pension schemes and the career patterns of
workers.
Regarding  the income distribution, one assumption  is to
postulate that all workers start with the same income, which
grows by a given percentage each year.  The income distribution
would then reflect the age distribution and the growth rate of
wages.  An alternative assumption is to postulate that all
workers earn the same income, which increases over time by the
given growth  rate.  The income distribution would then be
completely  flat.
Regarding  the age distribution, one formulation  is to assume
a pillar population  structure which would imply a zero population
growth.  The alternative is to use a pyramidal  demographic
structure associated with a positive population  growth rate.
In mechanical  terms, the limit to the accumulation of
capital in relation to GNP is given by the algebra set out above.
Taking the simple case where r=g=o,  it is easy to see that if
k=10%, n=40 and m=20, workers with 40 years of contributions
would accumulate  funds equal to 4 times their annual income,
workers with  39 years would have funds equal to 3.9 times their
incomes, and so on.  Thus, if it is assumed that the income
distribution  is flat, the population structure resembles a
pillar, coverage is universal, and all workers have full careers,
the total  funds of pension plans for active workers would amount
to 205% of labor income.
25In addition to the balances of active workers,  account must
also be taken of the balances of pensioners  or passive workers.
Continuing  to assume a pillar demographic structure  and r=g--O,  it
can be seen that, if the pension rate is equal to 20% of wages
(which it would have to be under these assumptions),  the balances
of pensioners would range from 3.8 times the annual wage  for
pensioners who are retired for one year, to 3.6 times  for those
who are retired for two years, and so on.  The total funds of
pensioners would then amount to 95% of annual  wages.
Thus, under these assumptions,  the balances of both groups
would amount to 300% of the wage bill.  Table 3a shows the size
of balances for different  combinations of wage growth rates and
interest rates under the assumption of pensions  i]idexed  to wages,
a constant contribution  rate of 10%, working and retirement  lives
of 40 and 20 years respectively, and zero population  growth  (i.e.
a pillar demographic  structure).  Table 3b shows the size of
balances when the population growth rate is 1.6% and the
resulting population  structure is a pyramid 12. (Figures 4a and
4b show the total size of accumulated funds as a proportion  of
the wage bill for different combinations of interest and wage
growth rates.)
These calculations  correspond to those of table 2a where
higher  interest rates imply higher pension rates and higher
growth rates imply lower pension rates.  However,  it is easy to
compute that, for a given targeted pension rate, a positive "r"
would imply lower accumulated balances, while a positive  "g"
would imply the opposite.  It is also easy to see that, again for
a given pension rate, a longer working life and shorter
retirement  life would  imply smaller accumulated  funds, mainly
because the required  funds for a shorter retirement  life would be
smaller.
Table 2a shows that with pensions indexed to wages,  a
working life of 40 years,  a retirement life of 20 years,  a real
wage growth rate of 2% and a real interest rate of 5%, a 10%
contribution rate would provide a pension rate of 50%.  Table 3a
then shows that with a pillar demographic structure,  universal
coverage and full working careers, the total accumulated  balances
would be equal to just over 500% of the total wage bill 1 3.
12  It can be seen from Tables 3a and 3b that if r=g and
pensions are indexed to wages, the same rezults obtain  as when
r=g=o.
13  Table 3b shows that with a population  growth rate of
1.6% and the resulting pyramidal demographic  structure, total
accumulated  balances would correspond to just over 300% of the
total wage bill.
26Table  3a
Accumulated  Pension  Fund Balances*
(per cent  of total  wage  bill)
Growth  Rate  of Real  Wages
0%  1%  2%  3%  4%  5%
Real  Interest  Rate
0%  300  257  223  196  174  156
1%  355  300  257  224  196  174
2%  423  354  300  258  224  197
3%  511  422  353  300  258  225
4%  624  508  420  353  300  258
5%  769  619  506  419  352  300
10%  2499  1903  1468  1148  910  731
*  Pensions  indexed  to wages,  k=10%,  n=40,  m=20,  pillar
demographic  structure  (0%  population  growth),  dependency
rate  50%.
Table  3b
Accumulated  Pension  Fund Balances*
(per cent  of total  wage  bill)
Growth  Rate  of Real  Wages
0%t  1%  2%  3%  4%  5%
Real  Interest  Rate
0%  188  163  143  127  114  103
1%  219  188  163  143  127  114
2%  258  219  188  163  144  128
3%  308  258  218  188  164  144
4%  371  306  257  218  188  164
5%  451  368  305  256  218  188
10%  1383  1065  831  658  528  430
*  Pensions  indexed  to wages,  k=10%,  n=40,  m=20,  pyramidal
demographic  structure  (1.6%  population  growth),  dependency
rate  30%.
27Figure 4a
Accumulated Pension Fund Balances
Pillar Population Structure, Pensions Indexed to Wages
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28Assuming a labor income  share of 70%, pension fund assets would
amount to 350% of GNP.  A smaller labor share, say 40%, would
still imply total pension fund assets of 200% of GNP.
Such an increase  in capital funds would  imply an increase in
the rate of saving, at least until the funds reach maturity.
Historically, the adoption of funded pension  schemes has not been
associated with an increase in the rate of household  and national
saving, probably  because of  offsetting changes in household
behavior.  But the absence of  a clear effect on the rate of
saving may also be explained by the lack of universal coverage,
the interrupted  careers of many workers, the absence of full
funding, the relative youth of most funded pension  schemes, the
low level of pension benefits  (relatively few workers are covered
by pension funds that provide a pension rate equal to 50% and
indexed to wages),  the low level of real returns  (it is unclear
whether a 5% real rate of return would prevail over a 60-year
period  in a country with universal coverage) and the pyramidal
demographic structure  (instead of the pillar structure  assumed
here).  A forced saving scheme that does not suffer  from these
shortcomings may more than offset the reduction  in voluntary
saving.
These factors may also explain why the total assets  of
pension funds in different countries are nowhere near the very
high levels quoted above.  The highest level of assets  in
relation to GNP of pension funds and life insurance companies
combined is found in Switzerland, the Netherlands  and the United
Kingdom where they range between 120% and 150% of GNP  (Vittas and
Skully 1991)  14.  In Singapore, where the CPF has been in
existence sir.ve  1955 and where contribution rates are quite high,
the total assets of the CPF correspond to around 70% of GNP.  In
some countries, total  financial assets, including assets  of banks
and other deposit institutions, exceed 300%, and even 400% of
GNP, but these totals  include a significant  amount of double
counting.
The accumulation  of large pension fund balances would also
imply a domination  of the financial system by pension funds.
This would have far-reaching implications for the management,
regulation and supervision of their assets and for the role of
pension fund managers  in corporate governance.  Failure to
properly regulate and supervise pension funds and ensure that
they are invested safely and profitably would undermine  their
ability to pay the targeted pensions.
14  Davis  (1992) has data showing the rapid growth  of total
pension fund and life insurance assets over the past two decades
or so.
29Would pension  fund assets ever attain such high levels?
This would depend  on their coverage, the career patterns  of
workers and the demographic structure as well as the relationship
between the growth rate of real wages, the real rate of interest,
and the age and wage/pension distribution of workers  and
pensioners.  But to absorb the vast expansion  in the availability
of long-term savings implied by Tables  3a and 3b, capital
intensity would have to increase substantially and would require
significant technological  advances in order to avoid a reduction
in the productivity  of capital.  Otherwise, the implied reduction
in real rates of return would question the feasibility  of funding
high levels of pension provision.
This question about the sufficiency of capital productivity
and investment returns is often expressed as a concern about the
adequacy of productive  assets as collateral in which pension
plans can invest their funds.  Manufacturing assets  are usually a
small fraction of GNP, no higher than 40% to 50%.  However, other
potential assets  include inventory, infrastructure,  houses and
land.  Financial  claims on these assets may be represented  by
mortgage and government bonds as well as corporate  securities, in
which accumulated  funds may be invested.  As already noted, there
are several countries  (e.g. Switzerland, the Netherlands  and the
United Kingdom) where pension funds and insurance companies
already hold assets that correspond to well over 100% of GNP.
.- Nevertheless, accumulation of pension fund balances  on the scale
suggested above would exert a downward pressure on real returns
unless technological progress prevented a reduction  in the
productivity of capital.
Another,  closely related, issue concerns the growing
reliance of pension funds on capital gains for achieving  their
target rates of return.  This  has adverse implications for the
stability and even sustainability of real returns and about the
long-term feasibility of funded pension schemes with universal
coverage.  Evidence from OECD countries with relatively  large
funded pension sectors shows considerable variation  in real rates
of return over prolonged periods, ranging from negative levels
between 1966 and 1980 to strongly positive ones over the 1980s
(Table 4).
Thus, unless  economic productivity were to increase
substantially as a result of the increased availability  of long-
term savings, a fully funded pension systsm with universal
coverage may not be able to pay targeted pensions.
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Real Pension Fund Returns
US  UK  Netherlands  Switzerland
1996-70  -5.4  4.2  1.7  0.8
1971-75  -0.8  -2.8  -1.4  -0.5
1976-80  -1.9  4.9  2.0  4.0
1981-85  8.1  12.4  10.5  3.0
1986-1990  11.2  10.1  6.3  -0.2
1966-90  2.2  5.8  4.0  1.5
Source:  Davis  (1992)
4.4  Demographic  pressures  and funded and pay-as-you-go  schemes
The  question  of the adequacy of capital productivity and
investment returns  tor fully funded schemes with universal
coverage is also related to the issue of whether  funded schemes
can cope better than pay-as-you-go schemes with  aging populations
and the resulting demographic pressures.  As shown in Tables 3a
and 3b, a pillar  demographic structure (zero population  growth)
implies a higher  level of pension fund assets than a pyramidal
structure.
This  issue can be addressed by comparing the simple algebra
of defined  contribution plans with that of pay-as-you-go  schemes.
The required contribution rate for a funded scheme, when pensions
are indexed to wages, is given by
(43)  c  =  p  *  G * D
F
where  "G",  "D"  and  "F"  are  defined  as  above.  If  "g"  is  equal  to
"r",  equation  (43)  simplifies  to
(44)  c  =  p  *  G *m  =  p  *  m
G *n  n
where the fraction m/n can be seen as the passivity  ratio, i.e.
the ratio of the retirement life over the working  life" 5. The
level of this ratio will depend on the age at which workers start
15  The passivity ratio is the inverse of the active
worklife ratio.  The passivity ratio corresponds  to the
dependency  ratio in social security parlance, while  its inve.se,
the active worklife ratio, corresponds to the support ratio.
31to contribute to a pension fund, their retirement  age, and their
expected retirement  life.
For pay-as-you-go  schemes, the required contribution  rate
when pensions are indexed to wages is given by
(45)  c  =  p  *  B  =  p * d
C
where  "B"  is  the  number  of  beneficiaries,  'IC"  the number  of
contributors,  and  "d"'  the  dependency  ratio.
The value of the dependency ratio is determined  by the  same
factors as the passivity  ratio, except that it is also affected
by the shape of the demographic structure.  In a society with a
demographic  structure that resembles a pillar, the two ratios
would have the same value.  If people work for 40 years  and live
in retirement  for 20 years, the dependency ratio would be equal
to 50%, the same as the passivity ratio.  If working  life is
extended to 45 years  and retirement life is reduced to 15, both
ratios would  fall to 33%.
Thus, if the rate of interest and the growth rate of real
wages are equal,  funded and pay-as-you-go systems would  require
the same contribution rate if the demographic  structure resembles
a  pillar.  Pay-as-you-go  systems would require a lower
contribution rate if the demographic structure resembles  a
pyramid and a higher  contribution rate if it resembles  an
inverted pyramid 16. However, the same pattern could also apply
to funded schemes.
This is so because the relationship between real interest
rates and real wage growth rates would also be affected by the
shape of the demographic  structure.  An economy with a young
population  and a low dependency ratio would tend to be
characterized  by a relative scarcity of capital.  In such an
economy, the real rate of interest would tend to be high, while
the growth rate of real wages would tend to be depressed.  A low
contribution rate would then be needed for funded schemes as in
16  Historically,  demographic structures resembled  pyramids
with a large base.  This translated into low dependency  rates so
that a given pension rate could be achieved with a low
contribution rate.  For instance, with a dependency  ratio of 10%,
a pension rate of 80% required a contribution rate of only 8%.
But with the aging of the population, the demographic  structure
changes shape, first to a pyramid with a smaller base, and then
to a pillar, requiring a substantial rise in contribution  rates
to achieve the same pension rate.
32the case of pay-as-you-go  schemes.  With the aging of the
population  and increase in the dependency ratio, there would be a
shift towards a relative scarcity of labor, which would tend to
produce a higher growth rate of real wages and a lower real
interest rate,  causing a rise in the required contribution rate.
The implication  of this analysis is that funding may not
eliminate  intergenerational transfers when demographic  structures
change, although a lot will depend on what happens  to economic
productivity and the real rate of interest when the capital
intensity of production  increases.  In response to demographic
pressures from population aging, the retirement  age may need to
be raised, regardless  of whether pensions are funded or not.
This will result  in a higher active worklife ratio  (a lower
passivity ratio)  and therefore a lower dependency  ratio.
4.5  Advantages  of a Multi-Pillar Structure
The uncertainties  regarding investment returns, capital
productivity,  demographic trends, not to mention political and
economic stability,  suggest that an approach based on a multi-
pillar system may be preferable on economic, financial  and social
grounds 1 7. A multi-pillar approach would combine a pay-as-you-go
(or partially  funded) first pillar offering a pension equal to,
say, 30% of net wages with a fully funded second pillar based on
individual capitalization  accounts offering an additional  40% of
net wages.  Such a system may combine the main advantages of the
pay-as-you-go and funded systems, while avoiding the
disadvantages of extreme solutions.
The first pillar  could be redistributive,  replacing  a higher
proportion  of income for low income workers and a lower
proportion  for high income workers 1 ".  It could consist of two
parts, one offering  a flat pension and the other an earnings-
related pension.  The contribution rate for the first pillar,
assuming it was financed from payroll taxes, would depend on the
demographic  structure  (and the level of any partial pre-funding).
For countries with mature populations, a contribution  rate of 10%
for the first pillar would be adequate for paying  a 30% net
pension rate.  But for countries with younger populations  and
lower dependency  ratios, the contribution rate for the first
pillar could be significantly lower.
17  A proposed strategy for pension reform based on a
multi-pillar  structure  is set out in Vittas  (1993).
18  A redistributive system, funded from payroll or general
taxes, would  be needed to cover workers with limited and
interrupted  careers as well as their dependents.  This is a major
issue in all countries, including both Chile and Singapore.
33The second pillar would require a contribution  rate of 10%
to 15%, depending  on what assumptions are made about the future
combination  of  interest  rates  and wage growth.  The net pension
rate  of 40% that might be targeted in the second pillar would be
easy to achieve with the suggested contribution rates as can be
verified from Tables  2a and 2b.  Thus, the total contribution
rate could vary from 15% in the case of young  countries to 25% in
the case of  old  ones.
Before  concluding  this  paper  it  is  worth  repeating  the  point
made  in  footnote  9  above.  While  most  of  the  analysis  is based on
constant contribution  and pension rates, both rates could in
practice be variable.  In fact, allowing workers to set both
their own contribution and pension rates, within  a specified
range, might be preferable and more consistent with greater
reliance on personal choice.
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